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ARTICLES
GOD, MONEY, AND SCHOOLS: VOUCHER
PROGRAMS IMPUGN THE SEPARATION OF
CHURCH AND STATE
HARLAN A. LOEB*AND DEBBIE N. KAMINER**

INTRODUCTION

Religious conservatives have experienced a "spectacular rise
to power and respectability during the 1990s."' Unlike the religious conservative movements of the 1980s, which faltered and dissolved, the religious conservative movements of the 1990s have
succeeded in expanding their membership and influence across the
country.2 One third of American voters now identify themselves as
evangelical Christians.3 Reverend Pat Robertson's Christian Coalition, perhaps the nation's most prominent conservative religious
organization, currently claims 1.7 million members nationwide."
Dr. James Dobson's Focus on the Family, another prominent religious conservative group, claims to have a mailing list of 3.5 million

* J.D., Cum Laude, University of Minnesota, 1991; B.A., Vassar College,
1986. Currently, Mr. Loeb is Vice-chair of the Civil Rights & Equal Opportunity Committee of the American Bar Association's Individual Rights and Responsibilities Section. Mr. Loeb is Midwest Civil Rights Counsel for the AntiDefamation League.
** J.D., Columbia University School of Law, 1991; B.A., University of
Pennsylvania, 1987. Ms. Kaminer was recently profiled by BARRISTER
MAGAZINE for her outstanding work on First Amendment issues. Ms. Kaminer is Assistant Director of League Affairs for the Anit-Defamation League.
The authors extend their appreciation to Robert Weisz, a student at the
University of Michigan Law School, for the substantial contribution he made
to the preparation of this Article.
1. Fred Barnes, The Battle Hymn of the Republicans, WALL ST. J., June
10, 1996, at A16.
2. Id.
3. Karen R. Long, 'Religious Left' Looks for Some Moral Clout, CLEV.
PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 12, 1996, at 1A, 18A.
4. Jeffrey A. Roberts & Virginia Culver, Religious Right Sets Sights on
State Politics,DENV. POST, Jan. 15, 1996, at 1A; Judy Keen, Reed Teetering on
GOP Abortion Plank, USA TODAY, June 20, 1996, at 8A.
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With their large memberships, religious conservative groups
have become politically influential. Religious conservatives in
general, and the Christian Coalition in particular, have been cited
as key allies in the Republican electoral wins in 1994.6 Such
groups also actively participated in the 1996 presidential election.7
In fact, aides to Dr. Dobson claimed that over 500 delegates to the
1996 Republican convention were Dobson followers! In addition to
their success on the national level, conservative Christians may
hold strongest influence on local school boards where they are well
represented across the nation.9
Their presence on local school boards reflects the significant
concern which religious conservatives have for education; this concern has prompted conservative religious groups to attempt to influence education in a variety of ways. For instance, both the
Christian Coalition and Focus on the Family have proposed socalled "religious equality" amendments to the U.S. Constitution to
circumvent the existing constitutional restrictions on prayer in
school.' ° If ratified, these amendments would tamper with the religious freedoms in the Bill of Rights for the first time since it was
ratified 200 years ago. Religious conservatives have also lobbied
for legislation that they claim would make public schools reinforce
so-called "traditional religious values."" In addition to their lobbying efforts, Focus on the Family has produced an educational video
promoting abstinence, and opposing safe sex, which has been purchased by over 11,000 public schools."
Conservative religious groups, including the Christian Coalition, have also been lobbying for school voucher legislation that
would enable parents to use state funds to pay for educating their
children at private schools including religious schools. 3 The
5. Marc Fisher, The GOP, Facing a Dobson's Choice, WASH. POST, July 2,
1996, at D1.

6. See, e.g., Ed Anderson, Foster: Harmony Was My Intention, TIMES-

PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Jan. 28, 1996, at 2A; Barnes, supra note 1; Roberts
& Culver, supra note 4.
7. James M. Wall, Dole and the Christian Coalition, Political Buyout,
CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Mar. 20, 1995, at 315.

8. Fisher, supra note 5.
9. Scott Canon, Christian Conservatives Wield Clout, WASH.

TIMES, Oct.

24, 1995, at A2.
10. Roberts & Culver, supranote 4, at Al.
11. See, e.g., Peter Applebome, An Array of Opponents Do Battle Over

'ParentalRights'Legislation,N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1996, at Al.
12. Fisher, supra note 5, at D1.
13. Rene Sanchez, Wisconsin High Court Suspends Vouchers for Religious
Schools, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 1995, at A2.
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Christian Coalition included a "school choice" (i.e. voucher) plan in
its "Contract with the American Family," a series of legislative
proposals patterned after the GOP's 1994 "Contract with America. " '
Religious conservatives and other voucher supporters have
succeeded in making school vouchers a major political issue. Legislators have introduced bills that would provide federal funds for
vouchers (for both sectarian and nonsectarian schools) in both
houses of Congress, 5 and Republicans in the House of Representatives have sought to implement a voucher program in the District of Columbia.' 6 In addition, state governments have witnessed
an influx of legislative efforts towards implementing voucher programs. Since the beginning of 1992, voucher legislation that
would spend state money on private schools has been proposed in
at least twenty-three states and the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico.' 7 Some states have considered voucher legislation several
times within the last few years. 8 At least eight states introduced
voucher legislation in 1996 alone.'9
14. See Richard Benedetto, Christian Group Calls for 'ContractWith Family,' USA TODAY, May 17, 1995, at 6A; The Christian Coalition's 'Contract
With the American Family,' CHRISTIAN CENTURY, May 24, 1995, at 560.
Voucher plans are sometimes referred to by other names such as "school
choice programs" or "opportunity scholarships." The particular name used is
not important, however, because the programs all operate in essentially the
same way, and the Supreme Court has made it clear that it is the
"substantive impact" of a program and not the label attached to it that matters. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 786 (1973).
15. ADL LEGAL BRIEF (ADL, New York, N.Y.), Sept. 1995, at 4; Vouchers
By Any Name: Come and Get Them! PE&RL NEWS (National Committee for
Public Education & Religious Liberty, New York, NY), Summer 1996, at 2.
16. Speaker Gingrich 'Caves In' on D.C. Vouchers, CHURCH & ST., May
1996, at 1.
17. See James B. Egle, The Constitutional Implications of School Choice,
1992 WiS. L. REV. 459, 461 n.12; Frank R. Kemerer & Kimi Lynn King, Are
School Vouchers Constitutional? PHI DELTA KAPPAN, Dec. 1995, at 307, 30710; Dick Lilly, Can Initiatives Save Education? SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 24,
1995, at Bl-B2; School Vouchers, ADL LEGAL BRIEF (ADL, New York, N.Y.),
Sept. 1995, at 1-4; Lori Sham, School Vouchers a Sticky Issue, USA TODAY,
Mar. 14, 1996, at 3A; Vouchers By Any Name: Come and Get Them! PE&RL
NEWS (National Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty, New

York, NY), Summer 1996, at 2-3. The twenty-three states that have proposed

voucher legislation are Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
18. See, e.g., Voucher Petition Fails in California,But LegislatorsPress On,
CHURCH & ST., May 1996, at 18 [hereinafter Voucher PetitionFails].
19. Sham, supra note 17.
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For example, the California Assembly passed a bill that would
provide state-funded vouchers to students in the worst-performing
public schools in the state. The vouchers, which the bill euphemistically calls "opportunity scholarships," would enable the students either to attend their current public school, another public
school, or a private school. Vouchers for students attending private schools would have a value equal to either the tuition for the
private school or ninety-percent of the state allotment per pupil,
whichever is less.' Although the bill is not expected to pass the
state senate, 21 it marks the second major effort in 1996 by California voucher proponents. Earlier in 1996, voucher proponents
failed to place a voucher initiative on the November ballot, and in
1993, California voters resoundingly rejected a voucher ballot initiative.' Similarly, the Connecticut legislature recently rejected
proposed voucher legislation for the third year in a row, and the
Florida legislature adjourned without voting on a bill that would
provide vouchers for use at both sectarian and nonsectarian private schools.
Part of the reason that voucher proposals have become widespread may be that vouchers appear deceptively tame in comparison to other proposed school legislation. For instance, another
plank of the Christian Coalition's "Contract with the American
Family" is the Parental Rights and Responsibilities Act. Despite
its relatively innocuous title, this legislation would have detrimental effects. It would allow parents to challenge and restrict the
teaching of secular subjects in public schools, as opposed to simply
allowing parents to have their own children "opt-out" of instruction
to which they object. The legislation also authorizes parents who
believe the government is interfering with their children to unleash a flood of litigation in which the government would constantly need to prove that state actions are "essential to accomplish a compelling governmental interest" and are "the least
restrictive means of accomplishing the compelling interest." In
addition, the proposed Act would make it more difficult for the
government to intervene when a parent's actions have endangered
the health or welfare of a child. When compared to bills like the
Parental Rights and Responsibilities Act, vouchers that give
money to parents to secure private religious education, and may
not encourage lawsuits, do not seem too objectionable.
Alternatively, voucher programs have been portrayed as the
20. Greg Lucas & Robert B. Gunnison, Assembly Oks School Voucher Plan,
S.F. CHRoN., June 1, 1996, at Al.
21 Id.
22. Voucher Petition Fails in California,supra note 18.
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"panacea" to the nation's ailing public school systems. In either
scenario, the facts are often interwoven with fiction.
Although vouchers contrast favorably with more extreme proposals, they create political controversy. Proponents of vouchers
argue that these plans will improve education (especially for poor
children), give parents more choice, more control, and promote religious values.' Opponents contend that voucher plans harm public education because they take needed money away from public
schools; disproportionately benefit wealthy students because
vouchers cover only a fraction of the cost of private education; offer
no real assistance to those students whose families have the least
information and money; and raise the possibility of providing state
funds to schools that may discriminate on the basis of factors like
race, religion, disability, and/or socio-economic status.' Voucher
opponents also note that several studies indicate that voucher programs do not improve student achievement.25 Moreover, voucher
programs infringe on private schools' autonomy by making them
financially dependent on the government and by requiring schools
to submit to government compliance reviews. 28
Legally, the voucher controversy centers around the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and parallel provisions in
state constitutions." Broadly speaking, proponents argue that
vouchers pass scrutiny under both federal and state constitutions"
while opponents contend that vouchers violate the separation of
church and state mandated by the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment, as well as similar provisions in state constitu23. See, e.g., Scott Stephens, Fans, Foes Debate School Vouchers, CLEV.
PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 16, 1995, at 2B, 4B; Dale D. Buss, Payday for Vouchers?,
CHRISTIANITY TODAY, October 23, 1995, at 76, 78-80; Tommy G. Thompson,
Vouchers Help All Students, USA TODAY, Aug. 23, 1995, at 10A.
24. See, e.g., Buss, supra note 23, at 77; Oppose School Vouchers, AUSTIN
AMERICAN-STATESMAN,

June 10, 1996, at A8; Sham, supra note 17.

25. See A. Phillips Brooks, Vouchers Opposed by Many Minority Lawmakers, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, June 6, 1996 at B1; Buss, supra note 23,
at 80; Cleveland's Voucher Plan, PE&RL NEWS (National Committee for Pub-

lic Education & Religious Liberty, New York, NY), Summer 1996, at 4; Steven
K Green, The Legal Argument Against Private School Choice, 62 U. CIN. L.
REV. 37, 39-40 (1993) (citing ERNEST L. BOYER, SCHOOL CHOICE 15-20 (1992)).
26. Green, supra note 25, at 54.
27. Egle, supra note 17, at 472, 499-500. Some legal analysts have also examined voucher programs under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., EDD DOERR ET AL., THE CASE AGAINST SCHOOL
VOUCHERS 20 (1995); Egle, supra note 17, at 487-99.
28. See, e.g., Mary Beth Lane, Defense of Vouchers Pledged, State Officials
Vow to Defend Vouchers, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 11, 1996, at 1B; Tommy

G. Thompson, supra note 23; Larry Rohter, Puerto Rico Takes Lead With
School Vouchers, and Feels the Arrows, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1993, at B5.
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tions.29 Voucher opponents argue that, under the Supreme Court's
rulings, the distinction between the state making a check out to
parents who then select a school and the state sending the money
directly to the school is a specious one. Currently, legal challenges
to existing voucher plans are pending in state courts in Wisconsin 0
and Ohio.31
This Article argues that school voucher programs that include
religious schools are unconstitutional. Part I contends that the
U.S. Supreme Court precedents indicate that voucher programs
are generally unconstitutional. Part II argues that the Milwaukee
voucher plan violates both the Wisconsin and U.S. Constitutions.
Similarly, Part III contends that the Cleveland voucher plan violates both the Ohio and U.S. Constitutions. Part IV asserts that
state constitutions generally appear to prohibit school vouchers.
As an example, this Part utilizes a case involving a Puerto Rico
constitutional challenge against voucher programs. Finally, the
Article concludes that, no matter how courts analyze these programs, voucher plans have the principal effect of unconstitutionally advancing religion.

I.

VOUCHERS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION

This Part argues that voucher plans that provide unrestricted
government aid to religious schools violate the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court. This Part supports this conclusion by surveying the
Supreme Court's cases that interpret the Establishment Clause.
As early as the 1940s, the federal courts have ruled that the
Establishment Clause applies to the actions of state governments
through the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 When the Court has heard
Establishment Clause challenges to state aid to religious schools, it
generally has struck down such aid programs.33 However, the
Court has upheld some programs that provide aid to religious
schools when the subsidies are earmarked for non-sectarian uses
such as the purchase of secular textbooks for all students.34
29. See Gatton v. Goff, Nos. 96CVH-01-193, 96CVH-01-721, 1996 WL
466499, at *3-4 (Ohio Ct. C.P. July 31, 1996); Plaintiffs' Complaint at 8-10,
Jackson v. Benson, No. 95CV1982 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane County, filed August 1,
1995).

30. Gatton, 1996 WL 466499, at *1.
31. State ex rel. Thompson v. Jackson, 546 N.W.2d 140, 142 (Wis. 1996)
(dismissing the original action brought before the Wisconsin Supreme Court
and lifting the stay of proceedings in the trial court).
32. DOERR ET AL., supra note 27, at 18.
33. Green, supra note 25, at 43.
34. Id. at 49 n.59.
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In earlier decisions on state funding of private school tuition,
the Supreme Court prohibited tuition reimbursements and tax
credits for private school tuition payments. In Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist"5 and Sloan v.
Lemon,3" the Court struck down educational programs in New
York and Pennsylvania that allowed parents of private school students to recover a portion of their private educational expenses
from the state.37 Parents of public school students were not qualified to take advantage of the New York and Pennsylvania programs.38 Writing for the Court in Nyquist, Justice Powell stated
that "insofar as such benefits render assistance to parents who
send their children to sectarian schools, their purpose and inevitable effect are to aid and advance those religious institutions."39
Programs that aid and advance religion run afoul of the Establishment Clause under the Court's ruling in Lemon v. Kurtzman.4 °
The decisions in Nyquist and Sloan also rejected the notion
that the Establishment Clause is not implicated where the state
aids sectarian schools indirectly by channeling money through the
parents of private school students rather than giving the money
directly to the school. The Court held that neither the name given
to the program nor the manner in which the funds were routed
was dispositive. Instead, the substantive impact of the aid program determined its constitutionality.41
In some of the Establishment Clause cases decided after
Nyquist and Sloan, however, the Court moved away from some of
the principles it had announced in the early 1970s. Using the
Lemon test less strictly, 2 the Court upheld some subsidy programs
that provided for private choice in education.43 In Mueller v. Al-

35. 413 U.S. 756, 804-05 (1973).
36. 413 U.S. 825, 832-35 (1973).

37. Green, supra note 25, at 57-58.
38. Id. at 58.
39. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 793.
40. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). Lemon established a three-part test, under which legislation must have a secular purpose, neither advance nor inhibit religion, and not excessively entangle government and religion, to survive scrutiny under the Establishment Clause. Id.
. 41. Green, supra note 25, at 59 & nn.15-16 (citing Sloan, 413 U.S. at 832;
Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 783, 786).
42. DOERR ET AL., supra note 27, at 19; Kemerer & King, supra note 17, at
308, 311 n.7. But see Witters v. Washington Dept. of Serv. for the Blind, 474
U.S. 481, 485 (1986) (stating that "We are guided ...by the three-part test set
out by this Court in Lemon") (opinion of the Court, joined by eight of nine
Justices).
43. Green, supra note 25, at 41-42 & n.18 (citing Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S.
388, 390-404 (1983) and Witters, 474 U.S. at 481, 483, 489).
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len, for example, the Court upheld a state income-tax deduction for
educational expenses for the parents of all public and private
school children in the state." Furthermore, in Witters v. Washington Departmentof Services for the Blind, the Court held that use of
state-funded scholarships for the disabled to pay bible college tuition was constitutional. 5
While some observers have regarded Mueller and Witters as
indications that voucher programs will pass constitutional muster, 6 this interpretation of the cases is questionable."7 Although
voucher plans are arguably analogous to the tax deduction upheld
in Mueller because they both involve private choice by parents and
may be available to the parents of children attending all types of
schools, these two factors alone do not determine constitutionality.
Rather, the Mueller Court considered many factors, including the
availability of many deductions for all taxpayers not just those
with school children. 8 Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist
"expressed 'considerable doubt' as to the constitutionality of
'outright grants to low-income parents.""9 Justice Rehnquist's
statement statement is an apt synopsis description of voucher
plans that pay the voucher's value to the parents of children attending private schools.
A careful reading of Witters appears to offer even less support
for vouchers than Mueller. First and foremost, Witters dealt with
college scholarships rather than primary or secondary education.
The Supreme Court has consistently drawn a distinction between
college and university level education and elementary and primary
school education. ° College students tend to be less susceptible to
religious indoctrination and have more academic freedom, even at

44. Green, supra note 25, at 60.
45. Id. at 63.
46. See, e.g., Egle, supra note 17, at 486 (suggesting that "a liberal interpretation of Mueller" might allow a voucher plan to withstand constitutional
scrutiny); Kemerer & King, supra note 17, at 308 (suggesting that Mueller

and Witters support the constitutionality of some school voucher plans).
47. Green, supra note 25, at 42.

48. Id. at 60 (construing Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983)).
49. Id. at 71 (quoting Mueller, 463 U.S. at 394, 396 n.6). See also Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 806-07

(1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part) (distinguishing between "tax deductions and exemptions" and "outright grants").
50. Green, supra note 25, at 71 n.180 (citing Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v.
Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 384 n.6 (1985); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S.
736, 750 (1976); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686 (1971)).

See also

State ex rel. Wis. Health Facilities v. Lindner, 280 N.W.2d 773, 779 (Wis.
1979); Kemerer & King, supra note 17, at 308.
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religious colleges and universities.51 Conversely, primary and secondary students tend to be more "impressionable."5 2 Furthermore,
sectarian primary and secondary schools frequently "provide an
integrated secular and religious education... [and] are often devoted to the inculcation of religious values. " '3 Given these differences between elementary and secondary education and postsecondary education, courts will not likely view Witters as an exclusive basis of support for vouchers for primary and secondary
school students. In addition, Witters limited its holding to the
facts of the case which did not include a program bent towards religion.'
The Supreme Court's decision in Zobrest v.CatalinaFoothills
School Districtreinforced the proposition that Mueller and Witters
do not offer much support for the constitutionality of voucher programs.' In Zobrest, the Court held that state funding for a signlanguage interpreter needed by a hearing-impaired student attending a sectarian high school was constitutional. However, relying on Mueller and Witters, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion anchored its holding on several factors including the independent
and private choice of schools, the lack of bias towards religion in
the statute approving the funding (the federal Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act), the purchase of a neutral service (i.e.
translation), and the absence of any relationship between qualification for the aid and attendance at the school in question.56 In
contrast, vouchers do not provide a neutral service and tend to be
51. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 750, quoted in Green, supra note 25, at 71 n.180;
Tilton, 403 U.S. at 686, quoted in Green, supra note 25, at 71 n.180.
52. Ball, 473 U.S. at 383, quoted in Green, supra note 25, at 43 n.26.
53. Lindner, 280 N.W.2d at 779-80 (citing Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349,
366 (1975)). See also Green, supra note 25, at 41, 46-49 (discussing the sectarian nature of private schools).
54. Green supra note 25, at 63-64 & n.143. Justice Marshall, writing for
the majority, enumerated elements regarding the program in Witters that led
the Court to conclude that the program was not skewed towards religion.
Among these, the Court commented that the program was "truly broad-based"
because the program's availability was not contingent upon the "sectariannon-sectarian, or public-non-public nature of the institution involved." Id. at
63-64 (quoting Witters, 474 U.S. at 487). The Court further noted that the
program did not "create a financial incentive" for the students to choose sectarian schools instead of secular schools. Id. at 64 (quoting Witters, 474 U.S.
at 488). The Court instead opined that the funds that flowed to the schools
did so only as a result of the students' independent decision to participate in
the program. Id.
55. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993). But see Kemerer & King, supra note 17, at 308 (suggesting that Zobrest supports the
constitutionality of some school voucher programs).
56. Green, supra note 25, at 65-66 (construing Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10-11).
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heavily skewed towards religion. 7 Given the decisions in Zobrest
and its predecessors, it appears unlikely that the Supreme Court
would conclude that a voucher plan that includes religious schools
is constitutional."
II.

THE MILWAUKEE PARENTAL CHOICE PROGRAM

In 1990, Wisconsin enacted the first voucher plan in the nation that allowed students to use public money to pay for education
at private schools. 9 As originally enacted, the Milwaukee Parental
Choice Program (MPCP) allowed any Milwaukee student in grades
K through twelve to attend, at no cost to the student's family, "any
nonsectarian private school" in the city, provided that:
(1) the family income does not exceed 175% of the poverty level;
(2) the pupil was enrolled in a public school in the city, was attending a private school under this program, or was not enrolled in
school the previous year;
(3) the private school notifies the State Superintendent [of Education] of its intent to participate in the program...
(4) the private school complies with 42 U.S.C. § 2000d [prohibiting
discrimination based on race, color, or national origin in programs
receiving federal money]; and
(5) the private school meets all health and safety laws or codes that
apply to public schools.60
Pursuant to the program, participating private schools also
had to "submit to financial and performance audits by the state.""'
No private school could have more than forty-nine percent of its
enrolled students receiving vouchers, and any school receiving
more applications from participating students than it could accept
had to choose from among those students randomly. 62 Under the
MPCP the state would send approximately $2500 in education
funds (money which would otherwise go to the public schools) directly to private schools for each participating student they enrolled. 3 Participation in the program was limited to one percent of

57. DOERR ET AL., supra note 27, at 17.
58. Cf. Kemerer & King, supra note 17, at 311 (arguing that the legal future of school vouchers is questionable or at least unclear).
59. Egle, supra note 17, at 461.
60. Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460, 463 (Wis. 1992).
61. Id.

62. Egle, supra note 17, at 470.
63. Davis, 480 N.W.2d at 463.
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the students in Milwaukee." In this form, the MPCP survived a
challenge brought under the state constitution.'
The exclusion of sectarian schools in the original MPCP prevented an Establishment Clause challenge, but the program
spawned a federal lawsuit in which the plaintiffs charged that the
exclusion of religious schools violated their rights under the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment." The district court
granted summary judgment for the state.67 While the plaintiffs'
appeal was pending, the Wisconsin legislature amended the MPCP
to allow sectarian schools to participate in the program. Furthermore, the amendment made tuition checks payable to the parent,
although still directing those checks to the private school and requiring the parent to endorse the check over to that school."
These changes to the MPCP gave rise to the legal challenges currently pending in the Wisconsin state courts.6'
A. The Constitutionalityof the OriginalMPCP
The Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that its state constitution did not prohibit the use of state-funded vouchers for nonsectarian private schools. As discussed above, the original MPCP included only nonsectarian private schools. When a group of
Milwaukee parents sued to force the State Superintendent of Public Instruction to implement the MPCP, several organizations intervened to challenge the constitutionality of the program. 0 Opponents of the MPCP argued that the program violated Article IV,
Section 18 of the state constitution governing the passage of local
and/or private legislation,7' Article X, Section 3 of the state consti64. Id. at 464.
65. Id. at 477. Two voucher schools closed in 1996 amid allegations of financial improprieties, and two other voucher schools are experiencing significant financial difficulties. Barbara Miner, Problems Escalate at Voucher
Schools, RETHINKING SCH., Summer 1996, at 9.
66. See generally Miller v. Benson, 878 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D. Wis. 1995).
67. Id.
68. Plaintiffs' Complaint at 5-7, Jackson v. Benson, No. 95CV1982 (Wis.
Cir. Ct. Dane County, filed August 1, 1995). The changes to the payment
scheme were apparently intended to make the plan less susceptible to constitutional challenge, but, as is discussed infra notes 107-08 and accompanying
text, these changes do little, if anything, to make the plan more constitutional.
69. Id. at 2-3. Conversely, as a result of the statutory changes to the
MPCP, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit vacated
the lower court decision in Miller v. Benson and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss it as moot. Miller, 68 F.3d 163 (7th Cir. 1995).
70. Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460, 460 (Wis. 1992).
71. Article IV, Section 18 reads as follows:
The right of every person to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of conscience shall never be infringed; nor shall any person be
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tution mandating the creation of "uniform school districts,"" and
an implied constitutional doctrine allowing public funds to be expended only for public purposes."
The majority of the court ruled against the MPCP's opponents
on all three grounds. First, the court found that the MPCP constituted neither local nor private legislation, and thus, it was not
subject to the procedural restrictions of Article IV, Section 18.
The court next ruled that even if the schools did receive state
funds, private schools participating in the MPCP program did not
qualify as district schools and therefore fell outside the scope of
Article X, Section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution.15 On the question of public purpose, the court stated that the only dispute
among the parties was whether or not the MPCP imposed sufficient government oversight on the participating private schools.
The court ruled that the supervision required by the MPCP was
sufficient to satisfy the public purpose doctrine implicit in the Wisconsin Constitution.7 ' Because the MPCP survived all three of the
opponents' challenges, the majority declared the program constitutional.77
One justice filed a concurring opinion, the theme of which was
"[1]et's give choice a chance!"78 Three justices filed dissenting
opinions. The first dissenter argued that the MPCP violated both

compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, without consent; nor shall any control of, or interference with, the rights of conscience be permitted, or any preference be
given by law to any religious establishments or modes of worship; nor
shall any money be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of religious
societies, or religious or theological seminaries.
WIS. CONST. art IV, § 18.
72. Article X, Section 3 reads as follows:
The legislature shall provide by law for the establishment of district
schools, which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable; and such
schools shall be free and without charge for tuition to all children between the ages of 4 and 20 years; and no sectarian instruction shall be
allowed therein; but the legislature by law may, for the purpose of religious instruction outside the district schools, authorize the release of
students during regular school hours.
WIS. CONST. art X, § 3.

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460, 462-463 (Wis. 1992).
Id. at 467-73.
Id. at 473-74.
Id. at 474-77.
Id. at 462-63.
Id. at 477, 478 (Ceci, J., concurring). Although Justice Ceci's short con-

currence does briefly touch on the constitutional roles of the legislature and
the judiciary, much of the opinion is devoted to lauding the legislature's attempt to alter "the sacred cow of status quo." Id.
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Article IV, Section 18 and Article X, Section 3.V9 The second dissenter argued that the MPCP violated Article X. However, the
second dissenter suggested that no determination could be made
regarding Article IV, Section 18 because the court never announced a coherent test for judging the constitutionality of a statute under that provision.c
The final dissenter argued that the
MPCP violated Article IV, Section 18.1
None of the opinions addressed the constitutionality of including sectarian private schools in the MPCP because the program
did not allow such schools to participate. However, in 1995 Wisconsin amended the MPCP to allow sectarian-private schools to
participate (perhaps in response to the lawsuit in Miller v. Benson). 2 Two groups of plaintiffs promptly filed suits challenging the
constitutionality of the amended MPCP under both state and federal constitutional provisions requiring the separation of church
and state." After the two cases were consolidated, Wisconsin's
governor petitioned the Wisconsin Supreme Court for leave to
bring an original action in the Wisconsin Supreme Court." In the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, the justices split evenly, while one justice did not participate. Three justices found that the amended
MPCP violated the state constitution, and three justices asserted
that the MPCP did not violate any constitutional provision. Consequently,
the
Wisconsin Supreme Court dismissed the original action and lifted
the stay of proceedings in the trial court.8 5
B. Analysis of the Amended MPCP Under the Wisconsin
Constitution
Given the existing case law, it seems that the trial court
should find the MPCP amendments unconstitutional. The provision of the state constitution on separation of church and state appears to provide grounds for the court to strike down the amended
MPCP without reaching the federal constitutional question. Article I, Section 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution states in part "nor
79. Id. at 478-81 (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 481-85 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 485-90 (Bablitch, J., dissenting).
82. Plaintiffs' Complaint at 5-8, Jackson v. Benson, No. 95CV1982 (Wis.
Cir. Ct. Dane County, filed Aug. 1, 1995).
83. Id. at 2-3; Plaintiffs' Complaint at 1-2, Milwaukee Teachers' Educ. Assoc. v. Benson, No. 95 CV1997 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane County, filed Aug. 1, 1995).
The Milwaukee Teachers' Association complaint also challenged the amended
MPCP under Article IV, Section 18 and the public purpose doctrine. Id.
84. State ex rel. Thompson v. Jackson, 546 N.W.2d 140, 142 (Wis. 1996).
85. Id.
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shall any money be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of religious societies, or religious or theological seminaries.""8 According to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the phrase "religious societies" refers to all religious organizations, and the word
"seminaries" simply means schools.87 Consequently, for purposes
of Article I, Section 18, a private school which provides religious
instruction and is operated by a religious group is a "religious
seminary."88 This would seem to furnish a basis for the constitutional infirmity of the MPCP.
The overwhelming majority of private schools in the United
States are religious schools," and the private schools in Milwaukee
are no exception. Of the 107 private schools operating in Milwaukee during the 1994-1995 academic year, seventy-nine percent
were religious.90 These religious schools enrolled ninety-one percent of the roughly 22,000 students attending private schools in
Milwaukee during the 1994-1995 academic year.8 ' Prior to the final enactment of the amended MPCP, 102 private schools had notified the Wisconsin Superintendent of Public Instruction that they
wished to participate in the new program, and at least sixty-nine
percent of these schools included are sectarian.9 The vast majority
of schools participating in the amended MPCP would therefore be
"religious seminaries," and the vast majority of participating students would likely be attending those seminaries. For these reasons, Article I, Section 18 applies to the amended MPCP. Because
the primary effect of using state money to pay tuition at these
schools is the advancement of religion, the amended MPCP should
violate the Wisconsin Constitution. The Wisconsin Constitution
states that the purchase of services from a religious institution for
a public purpose is constitutional provided that there is no establishment of religion. 93 An establishment of religion occurs under
86. WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18.

87. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Nusbaum, 115 N.W.2d 761, 765 (Wis. 1962).
88. Id.
89. Green, supra note 25, at 41 (citing Lynn Olson, New Approaches Blurring the Line Between Public and Private Schools, EDUC. WK., Oct 7. 1992, at
1).
90. Plaintiffs' Complaint at 7, Jackson v. Benson, No. 95CV1982, (Wis. Cir.
Ct. Dane County, filed Aug. 1, 1995). Of the 57 schools that have applied to
participate in the MPCP for the 1996-97 school year, 84% are religious. See
Miner, supra note 38. See generally Kemerer & King, supra note 17, at 308
(noting that, nationally, "85% of private schools are religiously affiliated.").
91. Plaintiffs' Complaint at 7, Jackson v. Benson, No. 95CV1982 (Wis. Cir.
Ct. Dane County, filed Aug. 1, 1995).
92. Plaintiffs' Complaint at 10-11, Milwaukee Teachers' Educ. Assoc. v.
Benson, No. 95CV1997 (Wis Cir. Ct. Dane County, filed Aug. 1, 1995).
93. State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, 198 N.W.2d 650, 653 (Wis. 1972).
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Article I, Section 18 when the act in question has the primary effect of advancing religion.9 The "primary effects" test asserts that
state funds "hav[e] the primary effect of advancing religion when
[they] flow[] to an institution in which religion is so pervasive that
a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the religious
mission."95
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has noted that private primary
and secondary schools are generally not just religious but are also
"pervasively sectarian."" The court has also stated that "the
very
purpose of many [private] elementary and secondary schools is to
provide an integrated secular and religious education. The schools
often devote themselves to the inculcation of religious values."'
Clearly, most, if not all, of such schools' religious missions subsume their functions. Any state education funds flowing to these
schools therefore have the primary effect of unconstitutionally advancing religion.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has twice held that religious
missions do not subsume certain functions at religious schools.
However, both of those cases are distinguishable from the MPCP.
In State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, 8 the court examined a statute
enabling the state to purchase dental education from Marquette
University, a Catholic institution. The court held that the provision of dental education did not involve religious instruction."
Here, however, the voucher program infuses money directly into
schools that teach religion as a principle part of their curriculum.
Nusbaum is also distinguishable from the MPCP because it involved university-level education. As noted earlier, the courts
have consistently drawn a line between primary and secondary
education and post-secondary education, and the courts have
treated the two types of education differently in terms of constitu-

94. Id. at 659.
95. State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, 219 N.W.2d 577, 583 (Wis. 1974). Although the court described the primary effect test in the context of the federal
constitution here, its discussion of Article I, Section 18 implies that the same
test applies to both constitutions. Id. at 585; see also, State ex rel. Wis.
Health Facilities Auth. v. Lindner, 280 N.W.2d 773, 783 (Wis. 1979).
96. Lindner, 280 N.W.2d at 779 (citing Meek v. Pittenger 421 U.S. 349
(1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973)).
97. Lindner, 280 N.W.2d at 779-80 (citing Meek, 421 U.S. at 366 (1975)).
See also Green, supra note 25, at 41 n.16 (describing most religious schools as
having curricula that include "religious indoctrination, worship, and general
instruction from a religiously centered perspective").
98. 198 N.W.2d 650, 652 (Wis. 1972).
99. Id. at 659-60.
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tional analysis."
In a separate case also entitled State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, °' the court ruled that public funds could aid religious
schools' special education programs for handicapped children because such education did not involve religion."
In the second
Nusbaum, the court focused on the "character" of special education
by asserting that "a professional educator of mentally retarded
children is not involved in the inculcation of religious tenets."'0 3
The same, however, cannot be said of the general education provided by the MPCP."I The circumstances under which the Wisconsin Supreme Court has concluded that programs at parochial
schools are not religious in nature is entirely distinct from the
MPCP program. Therefore, the court should conclude that the
primary effect of the MPCP is to advance religion in violation of
the Wisconsin Constitution.
C. Analysis of the Amended MPCP Under the U.S. Constitution
If the court considers the federal constitutional question, the
court should strike down the amended MPCP, as it unconstitutionally advances religion. As previously described in Nyquist and
Sloan, the Supreme Court held that programs designed to reimburse parents for private school tuition were unconstitutional because such programs advanced religion.0 5 In Wisconsin, MPCP
vouchers that enable parents to send their children to religious
M°
schools would have the same "purpose and inevitable effect""
of
advancing religion in the same way the reimbursements and credits in Nyquist and Sloan did. Because the MPCP would financially
promote the religious missions maintained by most private
schools, the MPCP fails the second prong of the Lemon test.
As the state sends the MPCP checks to the private schools
and only requires parents to endorse the checks over to the
schools, the voucher's financial benefit flows directly from the state
to the private schools. The pretense of making the check out to the
parent does not render the aid to the private schools indirect. The
U.S. Supreme Court has asserted that it is concerned with the
100. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text regarding the distinction
between college education, and that at a primary or secondary level.

101. 219 N.W.2d 577 (Wis. 1974).
102. Id. at 584-85.
103. Id. at 584.
104. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
type of schools involved with the MPCP.
105. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Nyquist and Sloan.
106. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 793.
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substantive impact of a private school aid programs. 017 Even if the
courts determine that the aid to the schools is only indirect, the
MPCP still remains unconstitutional because "[tihe economic effect
of direct and indirect assistance often is indistinguishable" 8 and
because "[a]id may have [the] effect [of a direct subsidy] even
though it takes the form of aid to students or parents."'09 A determination
that aid is indirect does not end the constitutional in110
quiry.
Moreover, the decision in Mueller is also unlikely to change
the outcome of the Lemon analysis as it applies to the MPCP. Although the MPCP is available to all parents with school-aged children, unlike the programs in Nyquist and Sloan, the MPCP is still
distinguishable from the program in Mueller. One fact that significantly influenced the Court's decision in Mueller was that the
tax deduction at issue was one of many tax deductions available to
all citizens of the state."' The MPCP, on the other hand, is only
available to financially qualified Milwaukee parents who have
school children. No comparable benefit exists for those who do not
have children in school. 1 2 In addition, the Court questioned the
constitutionality of tuition grants to low-income families."3 The
Court would have to stretch significantly its holding in Mueller,
therefore, to prevent the MPCP
from failing the second and third
4
prongs of the Lemon test."
The Court's decision in Witters is also unlikely to furnish support for the MPCP's constitutionality. Witters dealt exclusively
with a college scholarship created for non-religious purposes, was
limited to its facts, and featured only a single individual seeking to
use state funds to pay for a religious education. The scholarship in

107. Green, supra note 25, at 59 nn.115-16 (citing Sloan, 413 U.S. at 832;
Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 783, 786).
108. Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 565 (1984) (citing Mueller v.
Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 396 n.6 (1983)).
109. Witters v. Washington Dept. of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487
(1986).
110. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 399; Nyquist 413 U.S. at 780-81; Sloan, 413 U.S. at
831-32.
111. Green, supra note 25, at 60-61 (construing Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S.
388 (1983)).
112. Technically the MPCP applies to any "city of the first class." Davis v.
Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460, 469 (Wis. 1992). However, as of 1992, Madison was
the only city in Wisconsin other than Milwaukee that had a large enough
population to qualify as a "first class" city. See id. Even if other cities have
since grown in size, clearly not all parts of the state qualify as cities of the
first class.
113. Green, supra note 25, at 71 (quoting Mueller, 463 U.S. at 394, 396 n.6).
114 See Egle, supra note 17, at 485-86.
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Witters also existed before anyone sought to use it for religious
education."5 Because the amended MPCP was designed for elementary and secondary education, was created primarily, if not
exclusively, for the purpose of advancing religious education, and
was designed to impact more than one person seeking to use public
money to purchase a religious education, this program is distinguishable from Witters, and should fail the Lemon test.
The commentators' suggestion that the Court no longer
strictly enforces the Lemon test"' does not enhance MPCP's chance
of surviving constitutional scrutiny. The Court still appears concerned with the divisiveness that might result from a program that
aids religious institutions."7 Programs like the MPCP could lead to
the division of society along religious lines, and the battle over access to the program's sizable benefits could engender a great deal
of political divisiveness.
Additionally, it is unlikely that either of the two frameworks
that the justices have developed to clarify or replace the Lemon
test would allow the MPCP to pass constitutional muster. Justice
O'Connor has developed a framework in which an Establishment
Clause violation occurs when government endorses or disapproves
of religion."' When using this analysis, the Court has often found
violations of the Establishment Clause in elementary and secondary school settings. "9 In Grand Rapids School District.v.Ball," 0
for example, Justice O'Connor found an establishment of religion
where the state paid a parochial school teacher. 2 ' Because the use
of MPCP voucher money to pay tuition at private religious schools
would be analogous to, if not the same as, the state paying parochial school teachers, the MPCP should be an unconstitutional endorsement of religion under Justice O'Connor's endorsement

test. 122
115. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of Witters.
116. See supra note 46-47 and accompanying text for a discussion regarding
the strict enforcement of the Lemon test.
117. See DOERR ET AL., supra note 27, at 19.
118. Id. at 479-82.
119. Id. at 486.
120. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).

121. Id.; Egle, supra note 17, at 486.
122. See id. Justice Kennedy developed the second framework used to analyze Estrablishment Clause cases. This framework, known as the "coercion"
analysis, is also unlikely to provide a basis for the MPCP's constitutionality.
Justice Kennedy's framework consists of two principles: "government may not
coerce anyone to support or participate in a religion... [and] government
may not give direct benefits to religion in such a degree that establishes a de
facto state religion. Id. at 482. Justice Kennedy's framework has largely been

1996]

God, Money and Schools
III. THE OHIO VOUCHER PLAN

Cleveland's voucher program has also run a preliminary
course in the Ohio courts. An Ohio trial court recently reviewed
Cleveland's voucher plan enacted in June 1995 by the Ohio legislature, and an appeal is expected soon. ' The Ohio plan permits
1500 Cleveland students in kindergarten through third-grade to
receive state funds whether they attend private, sectarian or nonsectarian schools.'2' But for the voucher plan, the funds given to
these students would normally be directed to the Cleveland public
schools.'
Once in the program, a student would remain eligible
for voucher assistance through the eighth grade.' 6 The state pays
ninety percent of a participating student's tuition up to $2250 if
the student's family has an income not greater than twice the federal poverty index. For all other participating students, the state
pays seventy-five percent of tuition up to $2250.'1 7 The checks are
payable to the parents of the participating students, and like the

confined to cases involving government connection with religious symbols. Id.
at 486-87. But see Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (applying the coercion
analysis to prayer at a public school graduation).
Although Lee uses Justice Kennedy's coercion analysis outside of the religious symbols context, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, explicitly
declined to reconsider Lemon and suggested that coercion might be the minimum standard required by the First Amendment. Id. at 587. Justice Kennedy also noted that primary and secondary schools are unique settings, and
that students in those schools are especially susceptible to peer pressure. Id.
at 592-93. The focus of the coercion test, as applied, is the impressionability of
school children and the degree to which prayer and religion in public schools
is coercive. The Lemon test, however, is still controlling in Establishment
Clause analysis. See generally Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (applying
the Lemon test to a statute providing for silent prayer in schools); Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (finding that a school-sponsored prayer at a
graduation ceremony violated the Establishment Clause). a category in which
the MPCP does not fit. Because the MPCP would not likely be constitutional
under the federal or state constitutions, the Wisconsin courts should strike it
down.
123. Mary B.W. Tabor, Ohio Upholds Public Funding of Private and Religious Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1996, at A19.
124. Gatton v. Goff, Nos. 96CVH-01-193, 96CVH-01-721, 1996 WL 466499,
at *16 (Ohio Ct. C.P, July 31, 1996).
125. Id. Scott Stephens & Desiree F. Hicks, Educators, Others Sue Over
School Vouchers, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 11, 1996, at lB.
126. Gatton, 1996 WL 466499, at *2; Stephens & Hicks, supra note 125.
127. Stephens & Hicks, supra note 125; Memorandum from the National
Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty (PE&RL) to PE&RL
Organizational Members (March 25, 1996) (on file with author). But see
Plaintiffs Complaint at 4, Simmons-Harris v. Goff, No. 96CVH-01-721 (Ohio
Ct. C.P. Franklin County, filed July 31, 1996) (describing the vouchers as
having a maximum value of $2500).
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MPCP, the state would mail the checks to the schools directly."
For private schools to participate in the program, the schools must
meet certain state requirements including prohibiting discrimination based on race, religion, or ethnicity." The requirements also
prohibit the teaching of hatred based on race, ethnicity, national
origin, or religion. 30 Furthermore, the plan does not limit how
participating private schools may use the voucher funds (other
than those inherently imposed by the requirements described
above)."' Although the legislation creating the Cleveland plan allows scholarships to pay tuition at participating public schools in
neighboring school districts, none of these schools have elected to
take part in the program."'
A. Analysis of the Cleveland Voucher Plan Under the Ohio
Constitution

The Ohio Constitution appears to provide grounds for striking
down the Cleveland voucher plan. In this regard, two provisions of
the Ohio Constitution are relevant to this case: specifically, Article
I, Section 7, which deals with religious liberty and separation of
church and state;' and Article VI, Section 2, which provides for
funding for public 34schools and denies religious sects control over
state school funds."

128. Gatton, 1996 WL 466499, at *13. This payment scheme, like the one
included in the amended MPCP, should have no effect on the constitutionality
of the voucher plan. See infra note 169 and accompanying text.
129. Gatton, 1996 WL 466499, at *2.
130. Id.
131. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 8, Simmons-Harris
v. Goff, No. 96CVH-01-721 (Ohio Ct. C.P. Franklin County, fied July 31,
1996).
132. Gatton, 1996 WL 466499, at *12.
133. Article I, Section 7 reads as follows:
All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God
according to the dictates of their own conscience. No person shall be
compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or maintain
any form of worship, against his consent; and no preference shall be
given, by law, to any religious society; nor shall any interference with
the rights of conscience be permitted. No religious test shall be required, as a qualification for office, nor shall any person be incompetent
to be a witness on account of his religious belief; but nothing herein
shall be construed to dispense with oaths and affirmations. Religion,
morality, and knowledge, however, being essential to good government,
it shall be the duty of the general assembly to pass suitable laws to protect every religious denomination in the peaceable enjoyment of its own
mode of public worship and to encourage schools and the means of instruction.
OHIO CONST. art I, § 7.
134. Article VI, Section 2 reads as follows:
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As interpreted by the Ohio courts, Article VI, Section 2 likely
prohibits school voucher programs. In interpreting this constitutional provision, the Ohio state courts have not clearly defined the
scope and meaning of the phrase "control of' which appears in the
text of the Article. Judging the constitutionality of a state statute
that provided busing for all school children in the state, including
those attending private religious schools, the court of common
pleas held that the state legislature and the boards of education
retained control over the money used for the busing without defining the "constitutional and legal sense" of "control."' 3 After reviewing a state statute that provided aid and school material to
private schools, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that the private
schools did not have control of any state school funds, but, again,
explained the application and meaning of
the court never clearly
36
the term "control."
It remains unclear how these precedents apply to school
voucher programs because in both of the above cases the government directed the money to the public school boards which then
procured the "neutral" services from which the private schools received some benefit. 37 However, the decision in Protestants and
Other Americans United for Separationof Church and State v. Essex suggests that the Cleveland voucher plan is unconstitutional.
Essex pointed out that the items and services provided to private
schools under the challenged statute were not for use in the
schools' religious missions."" Rather, the public school districts
used the funding to supply personnel who provided religiously
neutral services for students with special needs." Essex specifically noted that the State Board of Education had the power to reject any request that might be used to impermissibly promote resubsid[ies]" to
ligion."" The court argued that "[d]irect money
2
religious schools would not be constitutional."
The general assembly shall make such provisions, by taxation, or otherwise, as, with the income arising from the school trust fund, will secure a thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout the
State; but, no religious or other sect, or sects, shall ever have any exclusive right to, or control of, any part of the school funds of this state.
OHIO CONST. art VI, § 2.
135. Honohan v. Holt, 244 N.E.2d 537, 544 (Ohio Ct. C.P.1968).
136. Protestants and Other Am. United for Separation of Church and St. v.
Essex, 275 N.E.2d 603, 608 (Ohio 1971).
137. Id. at 605; Honohan, 244 N.E.2d at 544-45.
138. 275 N.E.2d 603 (Ohio 1971).
139. Id. at 605.
140. Id. at 605, 608.
14L Id. at 606.
142. Id. (construing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970)). Although the court held that providing an indirect benefit to religious schools
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The Cleveland voucher plan is distinguishable from the statute in Essex because it does not restrict its support to religiously
neutral matters. Because no restrictions exist regarding the uses
43
to which the private sectarian schools can allocate the money,
schools could use the voucher money to promote and support religious activity and education. In addition, the Cleveland voucher
plan provides the kind of direct subsidies that the Essex court
stated would be unconstitutional'" Additionally, the Cleveland
voucher plan on its face falls outside the scope of the court's holding allowing certain aid to religious -schools that confer only an
"indirect benefit from general programs" and that do not give
"exclusive rights to, or control of' state education funds to the religious schools. 4" Accordingly, the plan runs afoul of Article VI,
Section 2 of Ohio's Constitution.
Assuming, arguendo, that the courts decide that Article VI,
Section 2 does not render the Cleveland voucher plan unconstitutional, Article I, Section 7 appears to provide grounds for finding
the voucher plan unconstitutional. The Ohio Supreme Court has
interpreted this Section of the constitution to mean that a municipality cannot raise funds or spend tax money to support or maintain a sectarian school. 4 The money that the Cleveland vouchers
would provide to private sectarian schools amounts to public education funds that the government would normally allocate to
Cleveland's public schools." 7 Because the program does not impose
any limits on the use of the money, the schools are free to apply
did not make the program at issue unconstitutional, id. at 608, the program
was not constitutional because the program indirectly aided schools. Rather,
the program was constitutional because it passed all three prongs of the
Lemon test. Id.
143. Memorandum from The National Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty (PE&RL) to PE&RL Organizational Members (March 25, 1996) (on file
with author).
144. Although the voucher checks are made payable to the parents of the
participating students, the checks are sent to the schools, the parents must
endorse the checks to the schools, and the money is deposited into the schools'
accounts. Gatton v. Goff, Nos. 96CVH-01-193, 96CVH-01-721, 1996 WL
466499, at *3 (Ohio Ct. C.P. July 31, 1996). As the Court of Common Pleas
has stated, courts must look at the substance rather than the form of the programs designed to aid religious education. Moore v. Board of Educ., 212
N.E.2d 833, 843 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1965). Given the facts above, the substance of
the aid in the Cleveland voucher plan flows to the private schools. However,
even if the aid were ruled indirect, that would not insulate the program from
constitutional challenge.
145. Protestants and Other Ams. United for Separation of Church and Sate
v. Essex, 275 N.E.2d 603, 608 (Ohio 1971).
146. Findley v. City of Conneaut, 62 N.E.2d 318, 323 (Ohio 1945).

147. See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
funding of the Cleveland voucher program.
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the public funds to support and maintain their religious missions.
The resulting arrangement would be analogous to the one
that the court of common pleas struck down in Moore v. Board of
Education.'" In Moore, a parent challenged a public school district's plan under which the public school teachers taught religious
instruction to the public school children during the children's release times. 49 Although the court noted that public school teachers
have the right to teach religious education outside of the public
school setting, the court held that, in the view of "impressionable
children," the teaching of religion-in the immediate vicinity of the
school, by the same people who the state paid to teach secular
subjects, eroded the separation of church and state." ° The Cleveland voucher plan, in precisely the same manner as Moore, enables
the state to funnel money to private sectarian schools to pay for
the education of "impressionable children." Despite the pretext of
moving to an adjacent building, these children received religious
instruction from the same teachers who provided secular instruction.'
For the same reasons, the Cleveland voucher plan should
be found unconstitutional.
It should be noted that the Cleveland voucher program is distinguishable from another statute which the Ohio courts found
constitutional under Article I, Section 7. In Honohan v. Holt, the
court of common pleas upheld a program that used state money to
pay for busing for all students in the state. The court held that
"indirectbenefits" received by religious schools as a result of busing their students did not constitute "'support' of a 'place of worship' within the meaning of Article I, Section 7V162 Any benefits
conferred by busing in Honohan were indirect because, according
to the U.S. Supreme Court,"' transportation is a general welfare
benefit analogous to police protection or sewer service."
Furthermore, the school board, and not the religious schools themselves, organized and procured the transportation. The school
148. 212 N.E.2d 833, 844 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1965).
149. Id. at 835. Three of the district's four elementary schools had only
Catholic students despite a distribution of non-Catholic students throughout
the district. Id.
150. Id. at 843.
151. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at Attachment B,
Simmons Harris v. Goff, No. 96CVH-01-0721 (Ohio Ct. C.P. Franklin County
July 31, 1996) (reproducing publications, produced by private sectarian
schools approved to participate in the program, which boast of incorporating
religious teachings into all instruction).
152. Honohan v. Holt, 244 N.E.2d 537, 544 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1968) (emphasis in
the original).
153. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947).
154. Honohan, 244 N.E.2d at 540-41 (quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 16-18).
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board was also the entity responsible for spending the state
funds.
The tuition payments under the Cleveland voucher plan do
not constitute a "general benefit" to the public, thus distinguishing
the Cleveland voucher plan from the busing plan reviewed in
Honohan. The court in Honohan determined that because the
busing plan benefited the students rather than the students'
schools, the plan did not violate the Establishment Clause. 15 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on Everson and explained that a government could provide "general welfare benefits"
directed towards everyone without violating constitutional mandates against state establishment of religion. 157 By paying or contributing to the tuition of private religious schools, the voucher
program benefits the parents who wish to send their children to
those schools; the principal effect of the voucher program under
these circumstances is government support of religious schools.
The distinction between public support of parochial schools and
general welfare support is manifest.
Conversely, the Cleveland voucher program involves a direct
benefit in the form of payments to cover tuition charges. Neither
the U.S. Supreme Court nor the Ohio courts have ruled that payments of money, even if nominally channeled through a third
party, constitute a general service comparable to transportation or
police protection. Thus, the holding in Honohan regarding indirect
benefits does not apply to the Cleveland voucher program.
B. Analysis of the Cleveland Voucher Plan Under the U.S.
Constitution
The Cleveland voucher plan also appears to violate the U.S.
Constitution for the same reasons that the MPCP violates the U.S.
Constitution. Similar to the MPCP vouchers, the Cleveland
voucher program enables parents to send their children to religious schools and thereby advances religion in the same manner as
the reimbursements and credits did in Nyquist and Sloan. In both
Nyquist and Sloan, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that such
advancement violates the second prong of the Lemon test." Con155. Id. at 544.
156. Id. at 545.
157. Id.
158. Brief for Amici Curiae Am. Humanist Assoc. et al., at 2-8, Gatton v.
Goff, Nos. 96CVH-01-0193, 96CVH-01-0721, 1996 WL 466499 (Ohio Ct. C.P.
July 31, 1996). Of the 54 schools approved to participate in the Cleveland
program by March 1996, 81% were sectarian. Memorandum from The National Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty (PE&RL) to PE&RL Organizational Members (March 25, 1996) (on file with author). As of June 13, 1996,
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sequently, the Cleveland plan fails the second prong of the Lemon
test because the substantive impact of the indirect flow of the
money would be the unconstitutional advancement of religion. 9
The Cleveland voucher plan is also distinguishable from the
program in Mueller. Like the MPCP vouchers, and unlike the tax
deduction program in Mueller, the Cleveland voucher plan is not
available to all citizens in the state.'60 Ohio citizens living outside
of Cleveland and Cleveland residents without children cannot receive the type of comparable benefit that provided the basis for the
Supreme Court to uphold the tax deduction in Mueller.' Here,
too, the Court would need to stretch significantly its holding in
Mueller to prevent the voucher plan from failing the second and
third prongs of the Lemon test. 6' In addition, Witters does not
support the Cleveland plan because the Cleveland plan applies to
primary and secondary education, while the plan discussed in Witters applied to college education. Furthermore, the Cleveland
voucher plan is skewed towards religion in sharp contrast to the
program in Witters which was directed at the secular study of
dentistry.16
C. Why the Trial Court Erred in Gatton v. Goff
1.

Application of the PrimaryEffects Prongof the Lemon Test

The court erred when it interpreted and applied the primary
effects prong of the Lemon test. Gatton correctly identified the
majority of participating schools as sectarian and correctly concluded that the main constitutional question was "whether the
scholarship program provides those schools with aid in a manner
86% of voucher recipients, who had selected schools, selected religious schools.
Gatton, 1996 WL 466499, at *9.

159. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Nyquist and Sloan decisions.
160. The statute creating the voucher plan, passed in June 1995, technically
called for the state to implement the plan in a single school district that, as of
March 1995, was under a federal court order mandating state management of
the district. Cleveland's was the only school district that qualified under the
statute. Gatton, 1996 WL 466499, at *1.
161. See supra notes 112-114 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Mueller with respect to the MPCP. See also Brief for Amici Curiae Am. Humanist Assoc. et al., at 10, Gatton v. Goff, Nos. 96 CVH 01-0193, 96 CVH 010721, 1996 WL 466499 (Ohio Ct. C.P. July 31, 1996).
162. Cf Egle, supra note 17, at 485-86.
163. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of Witters. See also Brief for Amici Curiae Am. Humanist Assoc. et al.. at 10-11,
Gatton v. Goff, Nos. 96 CVH 01-193, 96 CVH 01-721, 1996 WL 466499 (Ohio
Ct. C.P. July 31, 1996). See supra note 124 and accompanying text for a discussion regarding the application of Justice Kennedy's coercion test.
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which is constitutionally impermissible."" However, the court
misread the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions addressing the question of whether school-aid to sectarian schools is constitutionally
permissible.
The court asserted that "the Nyquist Court repeatedly emphasized the distinction between direct and indirect aid to private
sectarian schools"' and implied that Nyquist banned only direct
aid. However, the court offered no citations to support its contention that this direct/indirect distinction was made "repeatedly."
Furthermore, the court completely ignored the Nyquist Court's
statement that "the fact that aid is disbursed to parents rather
than to the schools is only one among many factors to be considered." 166 Despite Gatton, Nyquist stands for the proposition that
the degree of circuitousness of the aid stream plays a limited role
in the constitutional analysis of voucher programs rather than for
the proposition that the degree of circuitousness in the allocation
of funds is conclusive.
Gatton also misread Nyquist when it stated that "[tihe
Nyquist Court explicitly declined to apply its decision" to a program that made public funds available to students at both public
and private schools.'67 It appears from this skewed interpretation
that the Supreme Court distinguished between programs that included public schools from those that excluded public schools.
However, the Supreme Court actually stated that it "need not decide" whether the inclusion of public schools made any difference
to the constitutional analysis." Nyquist never stated that a program including public schools is immune from constitutional challenge.
The Cleveland court's departure from School District of the
City of Grand Rapids v. Ball furnishes another example of Gatton's misreading of the Supreme Court's "direct aid" cases. The
court understood Ball to support its muddled interpretation that
the pivotal issue is whether or not the aid flows directly to the
school. In Ball, the Supreme Court discussed programs that gave
public aid to religious schools in different forms. The Court concluded that "these differences in form were insufficient to save
programs whose effect was indistinguishable from that of a direct
subsidy to the religious school."" 9 Thus, the concern in Ball was
164. Gatton, 1996 WL 466499, at *9.
165. Id.
166. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 781.
167. Gatton, 1996 WL 466499, at *9.
168. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 782 n.38 (1973).
169. Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 394 (1985).
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the aid's effect rather than the manner in which the aid reached
the schools.
The Gatton court's summation of the "direct aid" cases underscores the court's confusion. In opining that the controlling factor
in the "direct aid" cases was that the state subsidized the religious
school's secular functions thereby leaving the school with more
money for their sectarian functions, Gatton wrongfully concluded
that aid flowing directly to religious schools would not be objectionable. 70 This result, which the court itself earlier noted was the
source of objection in Nyquist, demonstrates that the Gatton court
attempted to shape the analysis to conform to the court's predisposed conclusion.'
The court's reading of the "indirect aid" cases also appears
misguided. The court relies primarily on Mueller v. Allen. While
the court was correct in asserting that the Supreme Court distinguished the plan in Mueller from the plan in Nyquist, Gatton ignored the most important factor in the Supreme Court's distinction-a program that benefits public and private schools must
benefit the entire citizenry, not just parents of school children.
The court's description of the class of citizens who can take advantage of the program puts a different gloss on the statement that "a
program which 'neutrally provides state assistance to a broad
spectrum of citizens is not readily subject to challenge under the
Establishment Clause.""7 '
As in its interpretation of Nyquist, Gatton attributes inflated
importance to the parental choice factor in construing Mueller.
The court claims that Mueller stands for the proposition that
channeling aid through parents "can insulate a program from a
challenge on Establishment Clause grounds."7 3

While the Su-

preme Court noted that sending aid to the schools via the parents
"reduced the Establishment Clause objections" to the program, it
did not hold that such tactics vitiated Establishment Clause concerns altogether.'74 In fact, Mueller quoted with approval the
Court's statement in Nyquist that aid funneled through parents is

170. Gatton, 1996 WL 466499, at *15.

171. Id. at *9 (noting that the Nyquist Court objected to the fact that the
program at issue did not restrict the aid to secular functions).
172. Gatton, 1996 WL 466499, at *11 (quoting Mueller, 463 U.S. at 398-99).

It is also worth noting that the Supreme Court did not say that the program

in Mueller was the kind that the Court had reserved judgment on inNyquist.
The Court actually said that the Mueller program was "similar" to the program that the Court did not rule on in Nyquist. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 398.
173. Gatton, 1996 WL 466499, at *11.
174. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 399.
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only one of the numerous factors to be considered. 75
'Gatton continued to misread Supreme Court precedent by
making three interpretive mistakes when it considered the impact
of Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind. Although the court noted that the Supreme Court considered it important that the Washington program was not skewed in its operation towards religion,'7" the court failed to notice the larger
significance of the point. Determining whether or not a program is
skewed in practice requires statistical examination on data regarding the program uses. This requirement undermines Gatton's contention that Mueller intimates that statistical data need not be
used to examine a facially neutral statute and suggests that Mueller simply involved a refusal by the Supreme Court to examine the
contested program as applied. Second, Gatton failed to consider
the premise that aid to university level education can be distinguished from aid to secondary education. Finally, the court failed
to observe that Witters sought to limit its holding to its facts. 177 As
a result of these misinterpretations, Gatton misapplied the relevant Supreme Court decisions on school aid cases.
In its discussion regarding the lack of public school participation, the Gatton court failed to examine its constitutional impact.
Instead, the court simply pronounced the program constitutional
because, after a cursory review of how the program was applied,
the court found the voucher program was facially neutral. 78 This
conclusion directly conflicts with Witters. The precendental value
of Witters gleaned by Gatton was the mistaken notion that channeling aid to parents prevents any Establishment Clause challenge. As discussed above, both Mueller and Nyquist demonstrate
that the channeling of funds is only one of numerous considerations. 171 If the court had taken other considerations into account, it
should have found the Cleveland voucher program unconstitutional because the vouchers have the effect of directly subsidizing
religious institutions, independent of whether such funds aid either the religious or secular programs of those schools. 80
175. Id.
176. Gatton, 1996 WL 466499, at *12.

177. See supra note 54 and accompanying text for a discussion regarding the
Witters decision.
178. Id. at *14-15.

179. See supra note 56 and accompanying text for a list of factors to be con-

sidered when reviewing the constitutionality of funding that ultimately
reaches sectarian schools.
180. Witters v. Washington Dept. of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487
(1986) (stating that aid may have the effect of a direct subsidy to a religious
institution even though it is nominally aid to parents or students).
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Gatton's conclusion regarding the primary effects prong of the
Lemon test is convoluted. The court claims that the program does
not "pose any of the dangers the Supreme Court was concerned
with" in its Establishment Clause cases because the program does
not reimburse parents for tuition payments to the religious schools
nor does it subsidize the religions functions of the schools.18' The
Supreme Court made it clear in Nyquist that there is no constitutional difference between a tuition reimbursement and a tuition
grant."2 Here, the Cleveland plan subsidizes more than just secular functions because the plan subsidies according to its terms are
not restricted to nonsectarian functions. Thus, Cleveland voucher
money can be used to subsidize religious activities directly. This
program falls within the danger zones that ultimately concerned
the Supreme Court including "'sponsorship, financial support, and
' 8' Gatton,
active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.""
therefore, erred in its assessment of the second prong of the Lemon
test.
2. Application of the Entanglement Prong of the Lemon test.
The court also erred by refusing to test the Cleveland voucher
plan against the entanglement prong of the Lemon test. The
court's statement that the parties did not argue that the voucher
program would create unconstitutional entanglement between
church and state is inexplicable.'" The complaint filed by Dorris
Simmons-Harris et al. clearly states:
Under the Scholarship Program, public funds will be used to support and maintain religious education, worship, and other religious
activities. This use of public funds has the primary effect of advancing religion and fosters excessive entanglement between government

and religion, in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 85
Because at least one set of plaintiffs specifically alleged unconstitutional entanglement in their complaint, the court was obligated to apply the third prong of the Lemon test to the facts of this
case. 8' If the court examined the Cleveland voucher plan for en181. Gatton, 1996 WL 466499, at *15.
182. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 786-87.
183. Id. at 772 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n., 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).

184. Gatton, 1996 WL 466499, at *10 n.5.
185. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 9, Simmons-Harris
v. Goff, No. 96CVH-01-0721 (Ohio Ct. C.P. July 31, 1996) (emphasis added).
186. As for the court's concern about the continued validity of the entanglement portion of the Lemon test, see Witters v. Washington Dept. of Serv. for
the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 485 (1986) (stating that "We are guided... by the
three-part test set out by this Court in Lemon) (emphasis added).
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tanglement problems, it should have concluded that the program
fosters excessive and impermissible entanglement of church and
state.
The statute establishing the Cleveland voucher program
states that to be eligible for participation in the program a school,
must "not advocate or foster unlawful behavior or teach hatred of
any person or group on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin,
or religion." 8 ' Given that some of the schools that have been certified for the program teach that their religion offers the only path
to Heaven,188 their adherents are "the chosen people," and/or adherents of other religions are infidels, a serious possibility exists
that the schools are teaching a form of intolerance. Accordingly,
the voucher program's own requirements force the state to monitor
closely the schools' policies and practices. Therefore, "[a] comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance will inevitably be required to ensure that these restrictions are
obeyed."'89 "These prophylactic contacts will involve excessive and
enduring entanglement between state and church.""9 It is manifest, therefore, that the Cleveland voucher plan violates the entanglement prong of the Lemon test.
3. Failureto Review The Voucher ProgramAccording To Ohio
ConstitutionalMandates
Gatton also went astray when it reviewed the state constitutional issues. The court found that "the state and federal protections in this area [separation of church and state] are coextensive."19' Having held that the voucher plan complied with the First
Amendment, the court granted summary judgment for the defendants on plaintiffs' state constitutional claims. Assuming that the
court did rule correctly on the federal constitutional issues, the
court still erred by applying the state law precedents more broadly
than was appropriate.
The court cited South Ridge Baptist Church v. Industrial
Commission'92 for the proposition that "Ohio courts... have recognized that the rights protected by Art. I, Section 7 of the Ohio
Constitution are no more extensive than those protected by the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution."'93 South
187. Gatton, 1996 WL 466499, at *2.

188. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at Attachment B,
Simmons-Harris v. Goff, No. 96CVH-01-0721 (Ohio Ct. C.P. July 31, 1996).
189. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971).
190. Id.
191. Gatton, 1996 WL 466499, at *15.

192. 676 F. Supp. 799 (S.D. Ohio 1987).
193. Gatton, 1996 WL 466499, at *15.
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Ridge Baptist Church, as the citation indicates, is a federal court
case. In considering a challenge brought under both the state and
the federal constitutions, the federal court attempted to determine
how the Ohio courts interpret their state constitution. The federal
court concluded that "[t]he Ohio courts have given no indication"
that they would apply Article I, Section 7 in such a way as to provide more protection than the First Amendment.' Nowhere, however did the federal court state that the Ohio courts had determined that the Ohio and U.S. Constitutions offered exactly the
same measure of protection.
Rather, the federal court appropriately wary of extending state law - contended that the
Ohio courts had not given enough guidance for a court of another
jurisdiction to apply the principles of Article I, Section 7 in a particular way,in a particular case.
In fact, the Ohio cases cited by Gatton do not establish that
the separation of church and state provisions in the U.S. and Ohio
constitutions are always coextensive. Gatton is correct in stating
that the court in Honohan v. Holt disagreed with the assertion
"that the Ohio constitutional provisions are 'more restrictive' than
the provision of the First Amendment."'95 Before Honohan, however, made the above-quoted assertion, the court agreed that Ohio
courts need not follow the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of
the U.S. Constitution to interpret the Ohio Constitution."9 Immediately following the above-quoted statement, the court interpreted Article I, Section 7 of the Ohio Constitution, and then it
analyzed the statute at issue under that Section. Subsequently,
the court interpreted and applied Article VI, Section 2 of the Ohio
Constituti on. " .
If Honohan believed that the rights protected by the Ohio
Constitution were co-extensive with those protected by First
Amendment, no reason existed to interpret and apply independently the provisions of the Ohio Constitution. Alternatively, the
court could have asserted that the Ohio provisions provide the
same protection as their federal counterparts and that the First
Amendment discussion adequately addressed the question as to
why the statute at issue did not violate the Ohio Constitution. The
Honahan court's. separate analysis strongly suggests that although
the Ohio Constitution was perhaps no more restrictive than the
U.S. Constitution when applied to the facts in that case, the Ohio
194. South Ridge Baptist Church, 676 F. Supp. at 808 (emphasis added).
195. Honohan v. Holt, 244 N.E.2d 537, 544 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1968), cited in
Gatton, 1996 WL 466499, at "15.

196. Honohan, 244 N.E.2d at 543-44.
197. Id. at 544-46.
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Constitution offered protection independent of the U.S. Constitution. This view is supported by the court's statement that "we are
in agreement with the rationalization followed by the United
States Supreme Court in Everson and in Allen as applied to the
Ohio 'Bus Law' and that applying such reasoning to the Ohio constitutional provisions" produced the conclusion that the law in
question did not violate the Ohio Constitution.'98
The other Ohio case cited by the court is Protestants and
Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Essex. In Essex, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs' state
constitutional claim without extensive analysis. 9
Contrary to
Gatton's suggestion, Essex does not imply that the state constitutional provision does not have meaning of its own. The Ohio Supreme Court made no reference to its discussion of the First
Amendment issues in its discussion of the state constitution. It
simply asserted that the facts conflicted with the wording of Article VI, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution. It is, therefore, a daring
legal leap to assert Essex furnishes the basis for the proposition
that the Ohio Constitution never offers more protection than the
First Amendment.
Rather than acknowledging that the state and federal constitutions protect coextensive rights, the cases cited by the court indicate that Ohio courts have previously examined the facts of each
case under the Ohio Constitution 2°° by considering whether the rationales of U.S. Supreme Court decisions on the First Amendment
apply to the case at hand. Consequently, Gatton should have considered whether it was sensible, in context, to apply the reasoning
from federal decisions and whether the rulings of Ohio courts suggest a different approach. As discussed above,2 ' the decisions of
the Ohio courts in cases like Honohan and Essex indicate that the
Cleveland voucher plan violates the Ohio Constitution's guarantee
of the separation of church and state. Consequently, the court
should have struck down the Cleveland voucher program on state
constitutional grounds, even if it did erroneously conclude that the
program complied with the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

198. Id. at 545-46.
199. Essex, 275 N.E.2d at 608, cited in Gatton, 1996 WL 466499, at *15.
200. See Findley v. City of Conneaut, 62 N.E.2d 318 (Ohio 1945) (deciding a
question under Article I, Section 7 without any reference to the U.S. Constitution).
201. See supra notes 133-57 and accompanying text (Section A of Part III)
for a discussion of Honohan and Essex.
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IV. VOUCHERS AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS

As is evident by the Wisconsin and Cleveland cases, vouchers
appear likely to conflict with state constitutions in addition to the
U.S. Constitution. Every state and the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico has constitutional provisions protecting religious freedom and
liberty. 2
These state constitutional provisions are typically
stricter than the First Amendment. The constitutions of twentyfour states and Puerto Rico also contain explicit prohibitions
against spending public funds on sectarian education. 03
These state constitutional provisions provide the basis for
three prominent challenges to voucher legislation in the last three
years."° The first challenge arose in Puerto Rico after legislation
passed in 1993 created a voucher program that included both sectarian and nonsectarian private schools. The legislation provided
each participating student in second to twelfth grade with a $1500
voucher for each school year. The voucher could be used at any
public or private school that chose to accept the student except for
students transferring from one private school to another. Furthermore, no private school could have more than half of its students participating in the voucher plan. To qualify, a student's
family income could not exceed $18,000.'05 Participating students
who wished to attend private schools received certificates from the
202. DOERR ET AL., supra note 27, at 20.
203. Id.
204. The three challenges that will be discussed in this Article occurred in
Puerto Rico, Wisconsin, and Ohio. State courts in Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Vermont, and Washington have also considered school voucher
programs. In Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Washington the plans
were found unconstitutional. The Vermont court found the plan constitutional
under the federal constitution, which it considered stronger on the issue of
establishment of religion than the Vermont Constitution. Kemerer & King,
supra note 17, at 309. However, the Vermont case is easily distinguishable
from the voucher context. The court emphasized the fact that the defendant
town did not maintain a high school of its own, and distinguished this situation from one in which a school district maintains its own schools and still
pays for its students to attend private schools (i.e. a voucher situation).
Campbell v. Manchester Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 641 A.2d 352, 359 (Vt. 1994). This
case is also distinguishable from the voucher situation in that the court stated
that there had been no showing that the program at issue here would result in
any significant number of children attending religious schools or that the program created any monetary incentive for children to attend religious schools.
Id. at 359-60. The same cannot be said of voucher programs. In addition, the
court, acknowledging that it had an extremely limited factual record, restricted its holding to the facts of this particular case. Id. at 361. The court
even acknowledged that the case might well be "atypical." Id. at 359. Consequently, even if one accepts the reasoning of Campbell, it has no real precedential value for the voucher context.
205. Rohter, supra note 28.
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government. The students then had to turn the certificate over to
the private school which submitted the certificate to the government for reimbursement. 9 The program required participating
private schools to comply with school health and safety laws,
submit at least two reports per year on the performance of its students in the program, and admit students without discriminating
on any of a variety of bases."°7
Asociacion de Maestros de Puerto Rico, a teachers' organization, brought suit in Puerto Rico alleging that part of the Special
Scholarship and Free Selection of Schools Law, as the voucher
program was formally known, violated both the federal and commonwealth constitutions. 20 8 The Puerto Rico Superior Court ruled
that the portion of the voucher program that provided money for
students to attend private schools violated the Puerto Rico Constitution. The use of public funds to pay for teaching at and maintenance of private schools violated Article II, Section 5 of the Puerto
Rico Constitution, which prohibits the expenditure of public money
to support schools other than those of the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico. However, the court's opinion did not examine either
the issue of separation of church and state under the Puerto Rico
Constitution or the federal constitutional questions. 209
The defendants appealed to the Puerto Rico Supreme Court
which affirmed the Superior Court decision. The opinion of the
court relied heavily on Article II, Section 5 of the Puerto Rico Constitution which states, in part, that "no public property or public
funds shall be used for the support of schools or educational institutions other than those of the state. Nothing contained in this
provision shall prevent the state from furnishing any child noneducational services established by law for the protection or welfare of children."21" The court noted that the word "support" is not

qualified in the constitutional text and concluded from the legislative history of this provision that the "Support Clause" should be

206. Asociacion de Maestros de P. R. v. Torres, Nos. AC-94-371, AC-94-326,
1994 WL 780744, at *1 (Nov. 30, 1994).

207. Id. at *13 (de Rodon, J., concurring). Participating schools were forbidden from discriminating on the basis of "race, sex, color, origin or social condition, physical disability, political ideas or religious beliefs." Id.
208. Id. at *2.
209. Joseph L. Conn, Caribbean Controversy, CHURCH & ST., June 1994, at
4.
210. P.R. CONST. art. II, § 5, quoted in Asociacion de Maestros de P.R. v.

Torres, Nos. AC-94-371, AC-94-326, 1994 WL 780744, at *7 (P.R. Nov. 30,
1994). The opinion of the court also dealt with issues of standing, as did the
separate opinions. The discussions of standing will be ignored here because
they are irrelevant to the primary focus of this Article.
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interpreted broadly.21' However, the "Services Clause" was meant
to be construed narrowly, according to the court's reading of the
1
clause's history."
The court concluded that the Services Clause
was meant only to allow the Commonwealth to furnish private
school students the same non-educational services it provides to
public school students-(i.e. transportation)." 3 Taken together, the
court argued that these two provisions "[do] not allow State support of any private educational institution, religious or otherwise."""
The court found that the challenged section of the voucher
program violated the constitutional prohibition against support of
private schools because, by directly paying private schools for educating students, it "[gave] private schools a substantial aid, which
in fact directly contributes to advancing their educative purpose."2"5 The court rejected the defendants' argument that the
vouchers benefited the students rather than the private schools.
The court reasoned that students are the key to a private school's
continued existence; thus, the money which enables poor students
to continue attending a private school supports that school. The
program also supported private schools by providing economic incentives that encouraged students to attend those schools."' Finally, the court distinguished the vouchers being challenged,
which were for students who transferred from public to private
schools, from the unchallenged vouchers, which were for students
who transferred from private to public schools or from one public
school to another. The first type of voucher constituted an expenditure by the government, while the latter two types simply constituted "internal administrative measures" that provided a lower
magnitude of benefits to students.217
Two judges filed concurring opinions, and two judges filed
dissenting opinions. Although still declaring the voucher program
unconstitutional, one of the concurring opinions argued that Article II, Section 5 could only be understood in the context of the
separation of church and state despite the majority's assertion to
the contrary. The concurring opinion further asserted that Section
5 does not simply prevent public spending on sectarian schools
211. Asociacion de Maestros de P.R., 1994 WL 780744, at *7.
212. Id. at *8.
213. Id. at *7-8.
214. Id. at *8.

215. Id. at *9. Since the program aided the schools' educational mission, the
court concluded that the program was not permitted under the Services

Clause. Id. at *11.
216. Id. at *10.
217. Id. at *11.
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only for the sake of preventing such spending. Rather, the clause
is tightly linked to the general provision on the separation of
church and state, and the drafters specifically designed it to maintain a division between church and state, preserve freedom of religion, and prevent an establishment of religion."" The second concurring opinion found that the voucher program violated not only
the prohibition on aid to private schools, but also Puerto Rico's
constitutional mandate for the establishment and development of
a public school system.219
The first dissent charged the majority and the concurring
opinions with judging the wisdom rather than the legality of the
voucher plan. 20 This opinion asserted that the guarantee in Article II, Section 5, of an education to every person implied the right
to choose any school.22' The opinion later challenged the majority's
interpretation of the Support Clause by arguing that the history of
the provision indicated that it was meant to allow scholarships to
students and that such scholarships benefit students rather than
private schools.222 Finally, this dissent analyzed the voucher program under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. After
applying the Lemon test to the program, the dissent concluded
that the program was constitutional. m2
The second dissenting opinion also accused the majority of
usurping the legislative function of the commonwealth.2 Nonetheless, this opinion argued for the voucher program on policy
grounds by asserting that the court should have sought to reach an
outcome that would "address the different social, political and
economic problems that often affect" the commonwealth.22 The
second dissent contended that rather than erecting "a 'wall of
separation' between Church and State," the government only
2
needs to be neutral between religious groups."
Because the
voucher program treated all schools alike, whether public, private
sectarian or private nonsectarian, the opinion concluded that the
voucher plan did not violate any constitutional provision regarding
218. Id. at *12-20 (de Rodon, J., concurring).
219. Id. at *21 (Berlingeri, J., concurring).
220. Id. at *23-24 (Garcia, J., dissenting). This accusation is somewhat

hypocritical because Justice Garcia based part of his opinion on the proposition that validating the voucher plan would promote equality and help eliminate elitism in education. Id. The opinion also ends with the invocation
"HOW COSTLY FOR THE CHILDREN OF POVERTY!" Id. at *36.
221. Id. at *23-24.
222. Id. at *29-30.
223. Id. at *33-35.

224. Id. at *37 (Lopez, J., dissenting).
225. Id. at *38, *46.
226. Id. at *44.
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the establishment of religion and, therefore, passed the Lemon
test.2 7 Finally, the second dissent argued that the Support Clause
does not prohibit the use of vouchers for private education, especially where the voucher is applied to private, nonsectarian education.'
CONCLUSION

Analysis of the Wisconsin, Ohio, and Puerto Rico voucher
plans strongly suggest that voucher plans run into constitutional
difficulties on multiple levels. Almost half the states in the Union
have constitutional prohibitions against giving state funds to private or religious schools. State courts should rule, as Puerto Rico's
did, that these provisions bar all aid to private schools. Even if
courts rule, as the Wisconsin Supreme Court did, that some aid to
private schools is constitutional, voucher plans run into trouble on
other grounds. Because courts generally concern themselves with
the substantive effect of aid to religious schools, they should find
that voucher programs violate state and federal separation of
church and state provisions. Private schools are overwhelmingly
religious, and religious schools almost universally weave religion
into all of their educational activities. Consequently, any money
given to such schools has the primary effect of advancing religion.
This violates the separation of church and state provisions in both
state constitutions and the U.S. Constitution, as well as state prohibitions against aiding sectarian education.
Even if courts follow the superficial money trail they should
find voucher programs unconstitutional. Recent voucher plans
have nominally funneled subsidies to parents, but both the U.S.
Supreme Court and state courts have held that direct grants to
parents for religious school tuition violate the separation of church
and state. The inescapable conclusion is that no matter how they
are analyzed, voucher plans violate both state and federal constitutional guarantees of separation of church and state.

227. Id. at *45-46.
228. Id. at *46-48.

